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INTRODUCTION

In late October 2000, the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter "FCC") issued rules limiting the ability of providers of interstate telecommunications services to enter into exclusive
contracts to provide their services to tenants in commercial buildings. The FCC supported its decision to adopt these new rules with
assertions that it was enhancing competition. These rules, however, may very well produce exactly the opposite of their intended
effect.
II. THE BACKGROUND FOR THE FCC'S ACTION Is AN EMERGING
HIGHLY COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE FOR LOCAL TELEPHONE
SERVICES

The first major overhaul of U.S. telecommunications policy in
over sixty years became law on February 8, 1996. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereinafter the "1996 Act") made sweeping
changes affecting all consumers of telecommunications service and
the numerous companies providing those services in the domestic
marketplace.
A key element in the 1996 Act was the national policy of opening of local exchange markets-that is, telephone services offered
within a toll-free local exchange calling area-to competition for
the first time. While the FCC had permitted competition in interstate, interexchange telephone services since the early 1970s,' and
states had generally followed the FCC's lead for interexchange calling inside their borders, little had changed within local exchanges.
The 1996 Act fundamentally restructured those local exchange
markets:
Until the 1990s, local phone service was thought to be a
natural monopoly. States typically granted an exclusive
franchise in each local service area to a local exchange
carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires connecting telephones to switches), the
switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations),
and the transport trunks (wires carrying calls between
1. E.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (Dec. 18,
1980); Petition of New Ulm Telecom, Inc., 399 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Re Summary Investigation Into IntraLA TA Toll Access Compensationfor Local Exchange
Carriers,MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM'N, Docket No. P-999/CI-85-582 (1986).
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switches) that constitute a local exchange network. Technological advances, however, made competition among
multiple providers of local service seem possible, and
Congress ended the longstanding regime of statesanctioned monopolies.
The result of the sea change in telecommunications policy
embodied in the 1996 Act has been the rapid emerqence of new,
competitive carriers in larger metropolitan markets. These new
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, or CLECs, have exploited
the provisions of the 1996 Act which permit them to enter the market as equals to the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers or ILECs
(made up of the Regional Bell Operating Companies and the independent local carriers providing local services prior to the 1996
Act), to build their own facilities for handling telecommunications
traffic, to rent portions of the ILECs' existing local networks to fill
in missing pieces in their own networks, and to exchange traffic
with the ILECs on a peer-to-peer basis.4
CLECs have gone to considerable lengths to differentiate
themselves in the marketplace. Some have pursued both residential and business users in major metropolitan areas, while others
have gone after business users with fiber optic facilities connected
to interstate backbone network. Some have staked out smaller
markets in non-metropolitan areas, some have leveraged their affiliation with cable television and electric power utilities, and still
others have developed partnerships with Internet Service Providers
to deliver an expanded range of services to consumers, including
high-speed Internet access.5
One of the ways in which CLECs have tried to reach business
customers in the new, competitive arena has been by working

2. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
3. Ventura Administration StrategicPlanfor Telecommunications (Dec. 14, 1999).
There remain wide variations in the degree to which competition has emerged
across the country. In 1999, the Ventura Administration found, "[c]ompetition

for local phone service in Minnesota is minimal. There are emerging pockets
where smaller, independent competitive telephone companies are overlaying fiber
optic facilities in an incumbent telephone company's service territory." Id. (on file

with author).
4. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-253 (2000).
5. E.g., Company Information, at http://www.covad.com/companyinfo/; Delivering the Promise of Broadband, at http://www.northpoint.net/about.asp Adelphia
Business Solutions, at http://www.adelphia-abs.com; Who We Are, at http://www.
crystalcomm.com/whois.html; Welcome to AT&T Broadband, About Urban Media at

http://www.broadband.att.com; About Us, at http://www.seren.com/about.htm.
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through owners and managers of commercial buildings, seeking
partnerships and business arrangements giving the CLEC access to
the tenants in the buildings which those owners and managers control. 6 An exclusive access contract is one where the building owner
or manager agrees that only one carrier will be able to provide
telecommunications services to the tenants of a particular building.
One incentive used by some CLECs to obtain exclusive-access arrangements with building owners is a sharing of the revenues generated in the building.'
As part of its work implementing the 1996 Act, the FCC initiated a review of the general state of competition in local networks. 8
That inquiry ultimately included an evaluation of the need for the
FCC to promote competitive access to multi-tenant environments
("MTEs") such as apartment buildings, office buildings, office
parks, shopping centers, and manufactured housing communities.
III. THE FCC's RULING ESTABLISHED NEW RULES ON CARRIERS'
ACCESS To TENANTS IN COMMERCIAL MULTI-TENANT BUILDINGS
AND COMPLEXES
On October 25, 2000, the FCC released its order on Competitive Access Rules for Multi-Tenant Environments ("MTE Order").9
6. For example, "UrbanMedia collaborates with property owners and managers to deliver comprehensive e-business solutions to today's most under-served
market of small and medium-sized businesses. By creating a one stop-shop for
voice, data and e-business services, UrbanMedia bridges the gap between large and
small businesses .... [P]roperty owners and managers now can provide superior
service with our on-site service. UM brings maximized occupancy, increased revenue, and success to today's companies .... UrbanMedia-powered buildings are
successful environments." http://www.urbanmedia.com/company.html.
7. Brian Ploskina, FCC Gives BuildingProviders an Edge, Opens Access, INTERACTIVE WEEK, Oct. 31, 2000; see also http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/
0,4164,26480300.html.
8. Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets, 14
F.C.C.R. 12678 (1999).
9. In re Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local CommunicationsMarkets; Wireless Communications Association International,Inc. Petitionfor Rulemaking to Amend Section 1.4000 of the Commission 's Rules to Preempt Restrictions on Subscriber PremisesReception of Transmission Antennas Designed to Provide Fixed Wireless Services; Implementation
of the Local Competition Provisionsin the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Review of Sections 68.104 and 68.213 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Connection of Simple Inside Wiring to the Telephone Network, WT Docket No. 99-217; CC Docket No. 96-98;
CC Docket No. 88-57, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Docket No. 99-217, Fifth Report & Order & Memorandum Opinion
& Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, and Fourth Report & Order & Memorandum
Opinion & Order in CC Docket. No. 88-57, Oct. 25, 2000.
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The FCC's MTE Order prohibits both ILECs and CLECs from entering into exclusive contracts with commercial building owners,
clarifies the FCC's rules with respect to the location of demarcation
points, expands the FCC rules regarding conduits and rights of way
in the interior access pathways of MTEs, and extends the FCC rules
concerning over the air reception devices to include customers' antennae used for fixed wireless services. The MTE Order also begins
the process of requesting additional comments on several issues.
First, the MTE Order prohibits telecommunications carriers
from entering into exclusive contracts with commercial building
owners, which would limit the tenants of the buildings to receiving
telecommunications services from only one provider. The MTE
Order only addresses contracts with commercial building owners.
The FCC also sought comments on whether the prohibition should
be extended to residential buildings. The MTE Order applies to
both ILECs and CLECs, but only to those carriers' prospective
agreements. Thus, if a carrier has a pre-existing exclusive contract
with a commercial building owner, the MTE Order does not preclude enforcement of the contract, The FCC asked for comments
on whether the restriction should be extended to pre-existing contracts.
Second, the MTE Order establishes a process under which a
building owner can request that the wiring demarcation point be
relocated. The demarcation point is the location at which the
ILEC's control of the wiring ends and the subscriber's begins. Under current law, the demarcation point may be located at either the
minimum point of entry ("MPOE") or further inside the premises.
The FCC declined to specify the MPOE as the demarcation point,
fearing that such a definition would disfavor competitors who are
renting pieces of their network from the ILECs, because those
CLECs would be required to enter into independent negotiations
with the building owner for access to building wiring to complete
their networks. The MTE Order requires ILECs, or CLECs that
have control of inside wiring, to relocate or disclose the location
the demarcation point to the MPOE at the building owner's request.
Third, the MTE Order requires utilities, including ILECs, to allow telecommunications carriers and cable operators reasonable
and nondiscriminatory access to conduits and rights of way inside
customer buildings and campuses, if that utility owns or controls
the conduits or rights of way. The right-of-way exists where "(1) a
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pathway is actually used or has been specifically designated for use
as part of its transmission and distribution network and (2) the
boundaries of that pathway are clearly defined, either by written
specification or by an unambiguous physical demarcation."'0 The
MTE Order encourages utilities to negotiate for rates. The FCC
will determine on a case-by-case basis what qualifies as reasonable
and just compensation, but it will also consider future proceedings
to set appropriate rates.
Fourth, in order to encourage the development of advanced
services, the FCC extended its existing rules regulating over-the-air
reception devices to fixed customer-end antennae used for reception and transmission purposes. Therefore, parties with a direct or
indirect ownership of leasehold interest in property, including tenants in MTEs, should have the ability to place antennae (one meter
or less in diameter) used to receive or transmit fixed wireless service in areas within their exclusive use or control." In effect, the
FCC has preempted local and state government laws and regulations that restrict a tenant's ability to place such an antenna on his
or her own property.12
lV. THE FCC's ASSERTED BASES FOR ITS MTE ORDER MIX POLICY
REGARDING ILECS AND CLECS
In its most significant policy decision in the MTE Order, the

10. MTE Order at 82.
11. Id.at94-100.
12. In the MTE Order, the FCC also asked for comments on the following
issues:
*whether LECs should be prohibited from serving MTEs whose owners

unreasonably prevent competing carriers from obtaining access to potential customers within the MTE;
*the current status of the market for the provision of telecommunications services in MTEs, including the development of new access technologies;
*whether the prohibition on exclusive access contracts for commercial
buildings should be extended to residential buildings, and whether the
prohibition on future contracts should be extended to pre-existing contracts;
*whether carriers should be prohibited from entering into contracts that
grant them other preferences, such as exclusive marketing or landlord
bonuses to tenants that use their services;
*the definition of rights-of-way in customer buildings; and
*whether the FCC should extend its cable inside wiring rules to facilitate
the use of home run wiring by telecommunications service providers.
Id. at
125-175.
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FCC imposed the same operational restrictions on ILECs and
CLECs: neither class of telecommunications services provider may,
on a going-forward basis, "enter into any contract, written or oral,
that would in any way restrict the right of any commercial
multitenant premises owner, or any agent or representative
thereof, to permit any other common carrier to access and serve
commercial tenants on that premises."
The FCC justified that decision by noting that ILECs could use
exclusive contracts as a device to preserve their existing market
power, by barring other providers-CLECs-from offering service
to tenants in a building under an exclusive contract, and by increasing the costs of entry for CLECs through excluding large
MTEs from their potential market for customers.4
The FCC concluded that its rulemaking record did not provide
evidence that exclusive contracts in commercial MTEs would have
either efficiency-enhancing or pro-competitive effects, and found
that such exclusive contracts could be seen as a.type of vertical
re15
straint, or a restraint affecting firms in two different markets.
While the FCC admitted that CLECs presently hold only a relatively small share of the local telecommunications market compared to the share held by ILECs, the FCC announced that it was
"necessary to prohibit both competitive and incumbent telecommunications service providers from entering into exclusive contracts in
commercial settings, in order to assure competitive neutrality in the
market."' 6 The FCC said that CLECs could use exclusive contracts
to create market power, and building owners could benefit from
exclusive
contracts if they have some market power over their ten'7
ants.
On the issue of building owners, the FCC admitted that its new
rules would affect private contracts, and in particular could have
significant effects if applied retroactively to existing exclusive contracts. The FCC pointed to one court decision from the D.C. Circuit as its authority to modify provisions
in private contract when
"necessary to serve the public interest." 8
13.
14.

47 CFR §64.2500, "Prohibited Agreements."
MTE Order at 27.

15.

Id. at 28.

16. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 30-31.
18. Id. at 36 (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)). The Western Union case recites the general standard that the FCC can
"modify other provisions of private contracts when necessary to serve the public
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V. THE FCC's IMPOSITION OF LIMITATIONS ON CLECs Is
MISGUIDED FROM BOTH A POLICY AND A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

At a policy level, the FCC's decision to impose the same restrictions on CLECs as on ILECs is fundamentally flawed. As the FCC
itself admitted, CLECs have a small share of the local exchange
market. In fact, the FCC's own analysis of the local market for advanced services showed that, as of mid-2000, CLECs served only
about 7% of the most popular type of high-speed services, known as
ADSL,while the ILECs served the other 93%. 19 That was the highest percentage of advanced services provided by CLECs. In total, as
of mid-2000, all CLECs together accounted for 6.7% of local service
telephone lines, and more than 60% of those CLEC lines were in
use by medium and large business subscribers rather than small
business or residential users. 20
The anti-competitive actions ascribed to ILECs in the MTE
Order, the denial of access to entire buildings, exorbitant rates
charged by ILECs for access to specific buildings, unreasonable
conditions and delay, are real and can be readily seen to have negative effects on the entry of CLECs into the local exchange marketplace. 2 ' FCC action to limit the ability of ILECs, who have the inplace facilities needed to serve commercial buildings, who have
long-standing relationships with building owners and managers
due to their incumbent status, and who have the most to lose from
the growth of CLECs, would be a reasonable and measured response to the facts adduced in the rulemaking record.
Imposing the identical restrictions on CLECs, however, when
there are no parallel facts showing any material market power in
CLEC hands, no long-standing relationships to exploit, and no financial ability to distort the market with exclusive agreements, is an
interest." 815 F.2d at 1501. That case, however, rejected an attempt by the FCC to
modify a contractual settlement with a conclusory finding that certain rate disparities were contrary to the public interest. The court found that the FCC had not
weighed in any detail the trade-offs made in the contractual provisions, and thus
had not justified its abrogation of that contract. Id. at 1502.
19. In re Inquiry Concerningthe Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a ReasonableAnd Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuantto Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket No. 98-146, FCC 00-290 Second Report at 102 (Aug. 21, 2000.)
20. Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on Local Telephone Competition, FCC COMMON CARRIER BuREAu, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION, Dec. 4, 2000, at

http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink
/IAD/lcom1200.pdf.
21. MTE Order at I 17-19.
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insupportable administrative decision. The alleged improper activities of the entrenched ILECs do not form a reasoned basis for
preventing CLECs from experimenting in the market with new
forms of business arrangements with building owners and managers.
The marketplace is proving to be more difficult for CLECs
than most observers, including the FCC, had earlier believed. The
financial market was troubled during 2000 by the mixed track record of CLECs, and on the last trading day of 2000, slightly more
than half of publicly traded CLECs showed declines in price, while
only a few had significant increases. Among the largest drops in
price were US LEC Corp., which saw a 21% decline, ITC-DeltaCom,
which saw an 18% drop, and Focal Communications Corp., which
was down nearly 14%. Among the rising stocks were Intermedia
Communications, up more than 45%; CoreComm Ltd., up 34%;
and NEON Communications, which was up nearly 12%.2
Also, on December 29, 2000, Covad Communications-one of
the largest independent national CLECs, with potential service coverage for approximately 40-45%of homes and businesses in the
U.S. - announced that it was restructuring its Business Solutions division in order to reduce operating costs in 2001 by twenty to thirty
percent. The restructuring will reportedly result in a 400-position
reduction, or approximately 14% of Covad's employees. The work
force reductions are to take place throughout Covad's East and
Central regions, and the positions impacted are at all levels of the
organization, including sales, operations, marketing and support
functions. Coupled with a staff reduction announced on November 27, 2000, Covad's total head count was reduced by approximately 800 people in the latter part of 2000. The costs of the additional restructuring became part of an estimated $20 million fourth
quarter restructuring charge for Covad. 3
On December 27, 2000, Moody's Investors Service cut its rating of the unsecured debt of Rhythms NetConnections Inc., another major national CLEC that provides broadband communication services in most major metropolitan areas throughout the
United States and Canada. Moody's reduced the rating from B3 to
22. Mixed Bag Of Winners And Losers Among CLEC Stocks Today, (Dec. 29, 2000),
at http://www.clec.com/news.asp?categoryID=l 1.
23. Covad Restructures Direct Channels as Part of Previously Announced Restructuring Initiative, see http://www.covad.com/companyinfo/pressreleases/pr_2000/12
2900-press.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2000).
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The trade press reported that Rhythms' stock was down
more than 11% at mid-day on the 27th. At least part of that downgrade was believed to be due to concerns about the ability of
Rhythms' large ISP customers to pay their bills, and Rhythms
quickly announced that one of its two largest ISP customers - Telocity - was being acquired by Hughes Electronics Group. Rhythms
suggested that the acquisition should eliminate any concerns regarding the Telocity's future funding. At the same time, Rhythms
acknowledged that its other large ISP customer had signed an
agreement with Rhythms to transition approximately 7,000 of its
customers directly to Rhythms' network, thus placing collection issues on Rhythms' shoulders. 25
On December 14, 2000, Digital Broadband, a regional CLEC
with approximately 1,000 customers located throughout Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, announced it would lay off a substantial portion of its workforce due to adverse market conditions and
its inability to attract sufficient additional financing to fund its
26
business plan in the "extremely challenging" capital environment.
On January 12, 2001, Digital Broadband filed for bankruptcy protection after informing its customers that it had been unable to attract sufficient additional financing
to maintain its growth or to se27
cure "strategic alternatives."

An additional demonstration of the tenuous nature of CLECs'
business prospects was the November 30, 2000 announcement that
Verizon Communications-the major ILEC formed from the
merger of two Regional Bell Operating Companies (NYNEX and
Bell Atlantic) and GTE-had canceled its merger agreement with
data CLEC NorthPoint Communications, due to "the recent deterioration in NorthPoint's finances and operations." NorthPoint
subsequently filed a $1 billion civil 'lawsuit against Verizon in California state court alleging breach of contract. 28
24. See http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/qckSearch/qckSearch_rhisto
ry.asp?n-id=600042550&rid=10244638&frref=C&PB2_nam=Rhythms+NetConne
ctions+Inc%2E&searchQuery=rhythms&search=l&searchIdent=qcksearchportid=
&frameOfReference=corporate&ratg-clss-num=700750.
25. Wayne Kawamoto, Rhythms' Customers Grow Stronger, at http://www.clecplanet.com/news/0012/01226rhythms.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2000).
26. Market Slowdown Compels Digital Broadband to Reduce Workforce, at http://
www.digitalbroadband.com/news/pr12142000.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2000).
27. See Letter to Digital Broadband Customers, at http://www.digitalbroadband.corn (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
28. NorthPoint To Sue Verizon For $1 Billion, at http://www.isp-planet.com
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Taken together, these negative developments show that CLECs
are far from fearsome market-controlling entities, but rather are a
fragmented group of independent businesses, all trying to compete
with heavily-capitalized ILECs who far outmatch any CLEC in assets, revenues, personnel, or market penetration. The FCC's attention should properly have been on the ILECs alone, not on CLECs.
Against this factual background, all the FCC could say in support of its decision to limit the competitive options available to
CLECs to enter the MTE market through innovative arrangements
with building owners and managers was that it was necessary to "ensure competitive neutrality in the market," and that a CLEC might
be able to use an exclusive contact as "a device to create market
power. " 2 As the dissent to the MTE Order notes, "the question is
not whether there is sufficient evidence of ... pro-competitive benefits [of exclusive contracts] to warrant rejection of the proposed
rule ... but whether there is enough proof of harmful effects tojustify its adoption. I submit the record is devoid of such empirical
support."30
The FCC is not an agency with primary antitrust enforcement
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when the FCC attempts to base its policy
decisions on antitrust grounds, it should be reviewed on the same
basis as an antitrust enforcer. In the MTE Order, the FCC generally noted that an exclusive contract between a building owner and
a carrier, if viewed as a form of vertical restraint, might either increase or decrease consumer welfare. Looking to one article in
"the economic literature," the FCC observed that vertically related
firms might enter into long term or exclusive contracts that inefficiently deter or foreclose entry to a market and thus harm consumers. With no further analysis, the FCC stated, "[w] e believe that exclusive contracts between building owners and telecommunications
providers fit this model.""' Indeed, all the FCC found in the record
was a lack of evidence of benefit to competition or consumer welfare from the use of exclusive contracts in commercial settings, and
the support of four of the largest carriers-AT&T and three ILECs
(Bell Atlantic, GTE, and Sprint)-for a prohibition on exclusive

/news/northpoint-sues-verizon.html (Dec. 11, 2000); see also Verizon Ends Merger
With Northpoint, at http://www.clec-planet.com/0011/01130northpoint2.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2000).
29. MTE Order at 30.
30. Id., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchgott-Roth at 1.
31. Id. at 28.
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32

Amazingly, the FCC concluded that it should not make any
distinction among exclusive contracts based upon the length of the
contract, nor upon the market position of the carrier entering into
the contract. 33 This failure to consider the underlying facts-even
though those facts were used in the economic literature cited by
the FCC-would not pass muster in a traditional antitrust review.
The Seventh Circuit presented a clear framework for analysis
of exclusive contracts in its rejection of a claim by a smaller newspaper that exclusive licensing agreements between larger newspapers and news services/feature syndicates were violative of the antitrust laws. 34 The court observed:
Competition-for-the-contract is a form of competition that
antitrust laws protect rather than proscribe, and it is
common. Every year or two, General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler invite tire manufacturers to bid for exclusive
rights to have their tires used in the manufacturers' cars.
Exclusive contracts make the market hard to enter in midyear but cannot stifle competition over the longer run,
and competition of this kind drives down the price of
tires, to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Just so in the
news business-if smaller newspapers are willing to bid
with cash rather than legal talent. In the meantime, exclusive stories and features help the newspapers differentiate
themselves, the better to compete with one another. A
market in which every newspaper carried the same stories,
columns, and cartoons would be a less vigorous market
35
than the existing one.
A key element of the Seventh Circuit's analysis was the duration of the exclusive contract under review. Looking to the United
States36 Supreme Court's earlier decision in an exclusive dealing
case, the Seventh Circuit noted that even exclusive dealing contracts (such as the exclusive contracts between carriers and building owners/managers) are lawful if limited to a year's duration, because "exclusivity can promote competition by making it feasible
for firms to invest in promoting their products ...with year-long

32.
33.
34.

MTE Order at 32.
Id.
Paddock Pub'ns Inc. v. Chicago Trib. Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996).

35.
36.

Id. at 45.
FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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contracts, the entire market is up for grabs.""
This is, at its core, the same for CLECs trying to crack open the
local exchange market: if a CLEC can gain an exclusive contract for
a building for a period of time, the CLEC is much more likely to be
able to persuade investors to make the necessary capital investment
to purchase and emplace the equipment needed to provide new,
competitive services in that building. Particularly in the case of independent CLECs serving small businesses in commercial buildings, the risk of getting an acceptable return on that investment is
high and an exclusive arrangement with the building owner/manager may be the only way to bring the risk down to a level that permits market entry by the CLECs.
At the very least, the FCC had the obligation to develop a record demonstrating the terms of exclusive contracts that it found to
be objectionable, and the negative effects of contracts over certain
duration. The FCC noted in passing one party's comments that
commercial leases last five to fifteen years.'8 Even if this one party's
representation were accepted as true and universally accurate, it
would not shed any light on the duration of carrier-to-building
owner contracts, nor the effects of various lengths of such contracts. Only if CLECs are given the ability to experiment in the
market with varying forms of exclusive access arrangements will
there ever be a basis on which to conclude that a particular length
of exclusive contract is short enough to increase consumer welfare,
while a longer term overpowers that benefit with an effective "lock
out" of competitors. The FCC's blanket rejection of all exclusive
contracts makes it impossible for the market to try out various
forms of arrangements and learn their impact.
Similarly, it is fundamental in any analysis of an "essential facilities" antitrust issue, which the FCC appears to be relying upon
for its determinations, that there be (1) control by a monopolist of
an essential facility serving the monopolist's market, (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility, (3) the denial of the use of that facility to a competitor, and
(4) the feasibility of providing access to the facility.3 9 The FCC has
not made the very first of these necessary determinations. The FCC
acknowledges that CLECs are not monopolists, and finds only that
37.

Paddock, 103 F.3d at 47.

38.

MTE Order at 31.

39. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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40 Without a
building owners "may possess ...market power ....
starting-point basis for a finding of who the monopolist in this
market is, the FCC's analysis founders.4'
The paucity of reason behind the FCC's decision to treat all
exclusive contracts by all carriers identically, to bar them all without
any "rule of reason" analysis-is further shown by two aspects of its
MTE Order. First, the FCC declined to bar exactly the same exclusive access agreements in residentialMTEs, declaring that it did not
have "enough information in this record to determine if we should
forbid exclusive contracts under some or all circumstances., 42 The
FCC decided that the "predominant use" of an MTE would be the
determiningS 43factor in assessing whether the MTE is residential or
commercial. As a result, two buildings, side by side, differing only
by the fact that one building is 51% residential and the other 49%
residential use, would have exactly the opposite rule in effect: the
51% residential building could be served by a carrier under a contract that excluded all other carriers, while the 49% residential
building could not. This absurd result is not the product of reasoned decision-making by the agency.
Second, the FCC announced that it viewed the need for a prohibition of exclusive contracts as "primarily a temporary one designed to address a transitional problem ...once competition is
well established in commercial markets, it is unlikely that contracts
with building owners that are harmful to tenants would be sustainable ...[O]ver time the market power that building owners may
take advantage of today will diminish, as tenants' existing lease arrangements expire ...."4 This admission turns the entire exclusive
contracts decision on its head. On one hand, the FCC says that it
needs to bar exclusive contracts to ensure competitive neutrality in
the market, and to avoid CLECs creating market power. But on the
other hand, the FCC concludes that any such contracts that
harmed end-users would not be sustainable anyway. Further, the
40. MTE Order at 31 (emphasis added.)
41. E.g., Discom, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1996),
"To state a claim for monopolization, [plaintiff] must allege, among other things
that the defendants possess monopoly power in a relevant market. [Citations omitted.] In this case, none of the NYNEX defendants competes in the relevant market
for removal services ....
Thus, [plaintiffs] claim of monopolization must fail, since
it is axiomatic that a firm cannot monopolize a market in which it does not compete." Id.
42. MTE Order at 133.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 134.
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FCC recognizes that timing in the market is vitally important in
gauging the need for or vitality of exclusive contracts, but refuses to
make that very same distinction in its rules!
VI. CONCLUSION

It appears that the FCC, recognizing the lack of support in the
record for its decision on commercial MTEs, has attempted to hide
the harmful effects of its ruling in a claim that those effects will not
be long lasting. Not only is this approach to decision-making disingenuous, it points out the need for an utter rejection of the ruling.
The practical effect of the FCC's logical inconsistencies and refusal
to apply standard antitrust analysis is likely to be exactly the opposite of the result it claims to want.
CLECs are now struggling in the financial and business markets. If they are denied the ability to use exclusive contracts where
the benefits outweigh any potential harm to end-users, the CLECs
may never get to the nirvana of "well established" competition that
the FCC foresees in the MTE Order. Unless the investment community sees a fair likelihood of returns, that community will not regain its faith in CLECs.
It will be the cruelest of ironies if the FCC's decision to bar all
exclusive contracts-regardless of the duration of the contract, the
market power of the participants, or their effect on consumers-is
the straw that breaks the back of many a CLEC camel. CLECs may
fail, in part, because they could not use short-term and investmentprotecting exclusive contracts to wrest commercial MTEs away from
ILECS and use those buildings as sheltered beachheads in a longterm assault on the ILECs. If they do fail, the FCC will have done a
grave disservice not only to the owners and employees of the
CLECs, but to the users of business telecommunications services in
MTEs and elsewhere-that will see their competitive options wither
away under the FCC's overly simplistic and undifferentiated rule.
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